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Of Animals, Robots and Men 
Johannes Marx & Christine Tiefensee ∗ 
Abstract: »Von Tieren, Robotern und Menschen«. Domesticated animals need to 
be treated as fellow citizens: Only if we conceive of domesticated animals as 
full members of our political communities can we do justice to their moral 
standing – or so Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka argue in their widely dis-
cussed book Zoopolis. In this contribution, we pursue two objectives. Firstly, we 
will reject Donaldson and Kymlicka’s appeal for animal citizenship. We will do 
so by submitting that far from paying due heed to their moral status, regard-
ing animals as citizens misinterprets their moral qualities and thus risks 
treating them unjustly. Secondly, we will suggest that Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s reinforced focus on membership should draw our attention to the 
moral standing of a further ‘species’ living in our midst, namely robots. De-
velopments within artificial intelligence have advanced rapidly in recent 
years. With robots gaining ever greater capacities and abilities, we need to ask 
urgent questions about the moral ramifications of these technical advances. 
Keywords: Animal Politics, animal rights, robots, moral agency, citizenship. 
1.  Introduction 
In their widely discussed book Zoopolis (2011), Sue Donaldson and Will 
Kymlicka put forward a passionate case for the extension of citizenship so as to 
include domesticated animals. Simply assigning rights to animals, they explain, 
is not sufficient to account for their moral status. Rather, only if we conceive of 
domesticated animals as fellow citizens, i.e. as full members of our political 
communities, can we do justice to their moral standing. 
In this contribution, we pursue two objectives. Firstly, we will reject Don-
aldson and Kymlicka’s appeal for animal citizenship. We will do so despite 
agreeing on the main constituents of citizenship, which is characterised by an 
intricate interplay between requirements of membership, rights and duties. 
Pace Donaldson and Kymlicka, though, we will argue that extending citizen-
ship to animals does not amount to an appreciation of animals’ moral status, 
but rather misinterprets their moral qualities and thus risks treating them un-
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justly. Secondly, we will suggest that Donaldson and Kymlicka’s reinforced 
focus on the moral implications of membership should also draw our attention 
to the moral status of a further ‘species’ with which we share our living space, 
namely robots. Developments within artificial intelligence have advanced 
rapidly in recent years. The cognitive capacities of robots already surpass those 
of animals and are likely to overtake human performance soon. At the same 
time, the role and use of sophisticated robots in our daily lives will not only 
change, but also increase. Hotels are already planned to be staffed by humanoid 
robots. There are test runs of robots being employed within healthcare and 
astronautic operations, and robots are expected to perform regular household 
tasks in the near future. Consequently, with robots gaining ever greater abilities 
and becoming a more integral part of our lives, we need to ask urgent questions 
about the moral ramifications of these technical advances. 
To this end, we start with some basic explanations about the conditions that 
need to be met in order to assign rights, duties and citizenship to individuals, 
which will be fleshed out in greater detail as the paper progresses. As a second 
step, these criteria will be applied to animals. Their application to humans will 
be considered only insofar as it concerns controversial cases, most prominently 
with regard to children and the disabled. We close with some speculative re-
marks about the moral status of robots.  
2.  Rights, Duties and Citizenship 
2.1  Rights 
The ‘currency’ of rights would not be of much value if rights did not impose 
any constraints on the actions of others. Rather, for rights to be effective they 
must be linked with correlated duties: 
Right/Duty  A has a right to X if and only if B has a duty towards A to act 
in a way that does not hinder A from attaining X or that pro-
motes A’s attaining X.1 
Accordingly, rights are comprised of three components. Firstly, they concern a 
subject, i.e. the bearer of the right (A). Secondly, they identify an object, name-
ly the person against whom the right is held (B). Thirdly, they have a content, 
spelling out the action that is or is not to be performed for the right to be ob-
served (see Sumner 2000). 
                                                             
1  Although rights are correlated with duties, the reverse does not hold. For instance, even if I 
have the moral duty to help out a friend if he is in financial trouble, this does not imply 
that my friend has a right to financial aid (see Raz 1986, ch. 7). For an in-depth analysis of 
the structure of rights, see Hohfeld (1919). 
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Although these general remarks specify the internal structure of rights, they 
do not as yet determine which individuals are eligible right-holders. Two com-
peting answers to this question dominate the literature (see Kramer, Simmonds 
and Steiner 1998). According to advocates of the Will or Choice Theory, only 
those individuals qualify as right-holders who have the ability to exercise a 
right. That is, only a person who can choose either to impose or waive the 
constraints that her right places on others’ conduct can be seen to have rights 
(Hart 1982). Such an exercise of choice is no necessary condition within the 
Interest or Benefit Theory. Rather, interest theorists maintain that individuals 
are capable of having rights if they possess certain interests, the value of which 
provides reason to impose duties on others (Steiner 1994). 
In this paper, we will side with Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) and adopt 
the Interest Theory of rights. Accordingly, we will assume that rights are as-
signed on the basis of valuable interests which are to be safeguarded by rights: 
Right   A has a right to X if and only if X is a valuable interest of A (a 
part of A’s well-being that is a sufficient reason for holding B 
to be under a duty.2 
Which concerns fall into this category of valuable interests is a further, thorny 
question. For the sake of argument, we will again follow Donaldson and 
Kymlicka (2011, 24, 36) in holding that only individuals that are sentient beings 
with a “distinctive experience of their own lives and the world” can have inter-
ests. More precisely, any being will qualify as a right-holder that is a creature 
which can feel pleasure and pain and for which it is important that its life is 
going well rather than badly. 
2.2  Duties 
Although rights are correlated with duties, the eligibility criteria for being a 
right-holder are not the same as those for being a duty-bearer. To see why, it is 
helpful to distinguish between conditions for agency on the one hand and con-
ditions for moral agency on the other: 
Agency  Individuals qualify as agents if and only if they are capable 
of intentional action. An action qualifies as intentional if the 
individual chooses appropriate means so as to attain a specif-
ic end, given the individual’s beliefs.  
Moral Agency  Individuals qualify as moral agents if and only if they can be 
held morally responsible for their actions. They can be held 
morally responsible if and only if they (a) are able to evalu-
ate reasons for action and (b) can exercise control over their 
actions so as to align their conduct with reasons. 
                                                             
2  This is a slight adaptation of Raz’s (1986, 166) definition. 
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Based on this distinction, the eligibility criterion for being a bearer of duties 
can be specified as follows: 
Duty  Individuals qualify as bearers of duty only if and only if they 
are moral agents. 
Consequently, the bar for being a duty-bearer, and thus an object of a right, is 
raised considerably higher than that for being a right-holder. In order to qualify 
as a bearer of duties, an individual must not only be an agent with valuable 
interests, but also a moral agent. The reason why is relatively straightforward: 
As the fulfilment of duties demands that a certain action be performed or not 
performed, only those individuals who can direct their actions accordingly can 
reasonably be said to have duties. For instance, a person can be held to be 
under the obligation not to kick others only if he has the ability to suppress 
kicking actions. If such control is lacking – say because he suffers from spasms 
– no duty can be ascribed, nor would it be appropriate to hold him morally 
responsible if he happened to kick anyone. For, ought does, after all, imply 
can: If an individual cannot align his actions with certain rules of conduct, it 
cannot be the case that he ought to act as prescribed by these rules.  
In short, whereas possession of valuable interests delimits the class of right-
holders, moral agency marks out the class of duty-bearers. And since there is 
no reason to believe that a being with valuable interests is automatically a 
moral agent, there is no reason to believe that the class of right-holders is co-
extensive with the class of duty-bearers (see also Sumner 2000). 
2.3  Citizenship 
A citizen, Leydet (2014) suggests as the most general definition, is “a member 
of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of mem-
bership.” This definition nestles in well with Rawls’ (1999 [1971], 4) concept 
of society as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage” which is designed to 
advance the good of its members by distributing fairly the fruits and burdens of 
cooperation. Even at this most general level, these few remarks indicate that 
citizenship is a multi-faceted concept comprising various interlinking ideas. We 
have already encountered two of its basic building-blocks – rights and duties – 
above. Supplemented with the condition of membership, in the context of citi-
zenship they pan out as follows:3  
Membership  Only individuals who are members of a certain political 
community are eligible for citizenship. Following Donaldson 
and Kymlicka (2011), membership obtains if residency and 
                                                             
3  Compare also Janoski (1998, 9): “Citizenship is passive and active membership of individuals 
in a nation-state with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of 
equality.” 
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interdependence intertwine: An individual must share the 
same living space with a group of others whose lives are 
characterised by a high degree of interdependence. 
Rights  The aim of the societal cooperative venture is to further the 
interests of its members. Rights function as the protection of 
these interests. Citizenship rights go beyond universal rights 
in two ways. Firstly, citizens have the right to have their in-
terests taken into collective consideration: Their interests 
must find entry into the political decision-making process 
which weighs different concerns and converts them into po-
litically binding decisions. Secondly, citizenship rights are 
distinctively active rights of political participation: Citizens 
have the right to partake actively in the design of social 
norms and political institutions.  
Duties Social cooperation generates both fruits and burdens. Mem-
bership of this cooperative venture does, therefore, not only 
imply the enjoyment of rights, but also generates duties. We 
need not go so far as to suggest that members of the political 
community have a duty to participate in decision-making 
processes, or take on an active role within society. Rather, the 
basic duty associated with citizenship is to respect and obey 
fair rules of cooperation: It amounts to sharing the costs of the 
cooperative venture and to observing others’ rights.  
Consequently, an individual qualifies as a citizen if the following holds: 
Citizenship A citizen is a member of a political community who joins in 
the cooperative venture by enjoying rights of political partic-
ipation whilst fulfilling his duty to adhere to the joint rules of 
conduct and respect others’ rights. 
3.  Animals – Rights, No Citizenship 
With these preliminary remarks in place, we can now turn to the main ques-
tions of our study: Do animals have rights? Are they the bearers of duties? 
Should they be granted citizenship? Since, in line with Donaldson and 
Kymlicka, we will answer the first of these questions in the positive, we will 
present only a very terse discussion of animal rights here. In contrast to Don-
aldson and Kymlicka’s position, though, the remaining two questions will 
receive a negative response. It is these bones of contention in the guise of ani-
mal duties and animal citizenship which will form our main focus.  
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3.1  Animal Rights 
Animals, it is now widely acknowledged, are sentient beings: They feel pain 
and pleasure, they have desires and representational states of their environ-
ment.4 In Donaldson and Kymlicka’s (2011, 24) words, they have an individu-
al, subjective perception of their own lives and the world. We also agree with 
Donaldson and Kymlicka that animals’ interests are valuable, and thus that they 
need to be protected by rights. Which rights these are and with which duties 
they are correlated – for instance, if they imply that no pain must be inflicted 
on animals, or that animals must not be killed – cannot be our concern here.  
3.2  Animal Duties? 
A right-holder, we have explained above, is not necessarily a duty-bearer. 
Animals are one example where these two classes come apart. The reason is 
that although animals are arguably intentional agents – they have representa-
tional mental states which depict their environment as well as desires that guide 
their actions – they are not moral agents. In order to qualify as moral agents, 
animals would have to be able to align their actions with reasons for action on 
the basis of knowledge about these reasons. Neither, though, is the case. For, 
although animals have valuable interests and thus qualify as right-holders, this 
does not imply that they have abstract cognitive abilities that would enable 
them to reflect about their experiential states and entertain abstract thoughts. 
Put differently, animals have valuable desires, but no higher-order desires or 
reflective capacities. 
Despite this lack of abstract cognitive abilities, empirical studies show that 
animals can obey social rules within their own peer group. For instance, the 
alpha male of a group will not be challenged by other males, chimps engage in 
mutual delousing sessions, tigers do not bite hard when frolicking around, etc. 
This behaviour should certainly be treated as the following of certain social 
rules of conduct. Arguably, this rule-following behaviour can also be extended 
to human-animal relationships. For instance, the family dog refrains from 
jumping up on the fragile grandfather. This ability to follow certain rules and 
grasp the social status of their direct peers, though, does not suffice to establish 
full moral agency. Somewhat ironically, the discourse about animal rights 
provides a rather good case in point. For example, assume that moral reflection 
led to the conclusion that mice have the right to live. After all, mice are sentient 
beings: They feel pleasure as well as pain and care about having a good rather 
than a bad life. Consequently, mice must not be harmed. It would, of course, be 
absurd to claim that cats have the cognitive capacities to carry out this line of 
                                                             
4  This may not hold true for all animals. Any reference to animals should, therefore, be read 
so as to include sentient animals only. 
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reasoning. As such, they do not meet the first condition for moral agency: Cats 
are not able to evaluate moral reasons for action. Nor do they meet the second 
criterion: They cannot exercise control over their actions so as to align them 
with reason, as they are unable to influence first-order desires on grounds of 
second-order reflections.5 Consequently, since a cat cannot understand that a 
mouse has the right to live, it cannot be under an obligation to treat a mouse 
with respect. Although animals thus count as intentional agents, their actions 
are not liable to moral judgement: Animals are not to be held responsible for 
their behaviour. They bear no moral duties.6 
Although Donaldson and Kymlicka are not as explicit on animal duties as 
they are on animal rights, it is clear that they disagree. This disagreement does 
not stem from differing assessments of animals’ cognitive abilities – they 
(2011, 20) too submit that animals should not be ascribed higher cognitive 
abilities, such as the capacity of moral reflection.7 Rather, the disagreement 
concerns the correct account of moral duty. For, as Donaldson and Kymlicka 
would certainly be quick to point out, our stance on moral agency belongs to 
exactly that traditional, rationalist approach against which they campaign: It 
submits that it is “not enough to regulate your behaviour in ways that foster 
cooperation, you are supposed to do this for the right reasons” (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, 116). Once we distance ourselves from this mistaken account 
by decoupling being a duty-bearer from abstract cognitive capacities, their 
argument continues, we can see that animals too are subject to obligations. 
Consequently, justice “also requires that domesticated animals, like all citizens, 
respect the basic liberties of all” and “have the responsibility to exercise their 
                                                             
5  Since it is an empirical question whether or not animals possess the competencies that are 
required for moral agency, this conclusion inevitably reflects current empirical findings. Im-
portantly, the moral conceptions suggested here are not speciesist. If at least some animals 
evolved in such a way that they would reach higher cognitive abilities, they would also 
qualify as duty-bearers.  
6  It might be argued that this conclusion is too strong. For, although animals may not have 
any impartial moral duties as they are incapable of grasping universal moral reasons, it 
might be thought that animals still have relational or particularised duties to those social 
peers with whom they regularly interact. For the reasons provided above, we are sceptical 
about such a position. However, even if one felt drawn towards a position that combined a 
rationalist account of universal moral duties with a non-rationalist account of particular-
ised moral duties, this would not suffice to establish animal citizenship. For, as we will argue 
later, citizenship requires a moral perspective that goes beyond that of one’s closest peers. 
We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point. 
7  Despite denying that animals have abstract cognitive abilities, at times Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s formulations come perilously close to attributing evaluations that are based on 
higher-order reflections to animals. To give but one example, they (2011, 120) declare that 
dogs generally respond to their holders’ requests and ignore them “only when they have 
reasonable grounds for doing so.” It is clear that such an evaluation of reasonableness is 
ours, not that of dogs, so we must be careful not to blur this line. 
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rights in ways that do not impose unfair or unreasonable costs on others” (Don-
aldson and Kymlicka 2011, 150, 146). 
Indeed, a non-rationalist account of moral duty dovetails well with Don-
aldson and Kymlicka’s (2011, 30) general rejection of rationalist, cognitive 
conceptions of selfhood and agency. Alas, whereas they provide their interest-
based account of selfhood as a competing, and in their eyes preferable, position 
to the rationalist approach, their alternative non-rationalist account of moral 
duty remains unhelpfully vague. But no matter what the precise details of their 
position might be, we believe that any account which holds creatures morally 
responsible for their actions despite their lack of cognitive abilities wrongs 
these beings exactly because it does not pay due heed to their morally relevant 
cognitive limitations.  
To elaborate, let us start with the observation that assigning moral duties is not 
a theoretical exercise – it has practical consequences. At the very least, someone 
who violates his duty against his better judgement is blameworthy; at worst, such 
dereliction of duty is even punishable. To adopt Strawson’s (1962) well-known 
framework of moral responsibility,8 let us say that violations of duties induce 
negative reactive attitudes in us, such as resentment, anger, blame and rejection. 
These reactions are closely associated with the importance that we attribute to the 
attitudes and intentions which others entertain towards us, and the expectation 
that these intentions be ones of good will, respect and benevolence, rather than ill 
will, disrespect and malevolence. Hence, let us assume that an action which we 
believe to be based on ill will generally entices resentment.9 
Importantly for our purposes, though, such feelings of resentment are not 
always appropriate. The first set of circumstances which call for a suspension 
of reactive attitudes is one where the agent wronged us, but not on grounds of 
ill will – he did not mean to hurt us or did not know, he was pushed, etc. In 
cases such as these, the agent is one towards whom reactive attitudes generally 
apply – he is a fully responsible agent – but feelings of resentment are inappro-
priate with regard to a specific action. In contrast, in the second set of circum-
stances reactive attitudes need to be suspended not towards a specific action, 
but towards the agent himself. Maybe, the agent is seriously mentally ill or 
someone with a brain disorder, or indeed a child. Agents with limited cognitive 
or emotional capabilities stand, in an important way, outside of our moral 
                                                             
8  Despite also referring to the appropriateness of reactive attitudes, Strawson’s remarks often 
take on a descriptive hue. Here, we are interested specifically in in the appropriateness of 
reactive attitudes. 
9  Strawson’s emphasis on reactive attitudes such as resentment, anger or rejection shows a 
certain proximity to expressivist, emotivist or sentimentalist metaethical accounts. Although 
we employ Strawson’s approach here, we wish to remain neutral on the correct metaethical 
interpretation of moral judgements and believe that the arguments presented in this paper 
are compatible with differing metaethical views. Compare also Footnote 20. 
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community. Consequently, reactive attitudes must be withheld and replaced by 
an objective stance:  
To adopt the objective attitude to [an individual] is to see him, perhaps, as an 
object of social policy; […] as something certainly to be taken account, per-
haps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained 
[…] The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many ways, but not in 
all ways: it may include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, 
though not all kinds of love. But it cannot include the range of reactive feel-
ings and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with others in 
inter-personal human relationships; it cannot include resentment, gratitude, 
forgiveness, anger (Strawson 1962, 66). 
We suggest that animals fall into this second category of agents that are exempt 
from participant reactive attitudes such as resentment, anger and blame alt-
hough we might still form very close and loving relationships with them. Im-
portantly, this is so even if we grant, in line with Donaldson and Kymlicka 
(2011, 119, 123-6), that animals cannot only be conditioned, but socialised to 
observe rules of mixed-species relationships.  
To see why, let us return to our cat that likes eating mice, or a dog which en-
joys hunting squirrels. It might well be the case that dogs can be taught to re-
frain from hunting squirrels, and some similar training might even be applica-
ble to cats (although this might turn out to be considerably more difficult). 
However, we must be cautious when interpreting the dog’s actions. For, just as 
a dog’s not chasing after squirrels cannot be interpreted as the manifestation of 
its benevolence and respect for squirrels’ rights, its hunting squirrels cannot be 
read as an expression of its malevolence and disrespect for these rights. A dog 
does not hunt squirrels because it does not like them, nor do cats kill mice 
because they believe that mice do not have the right to live. Exactly because of 
their lack of cognitive capabilities and their inability to grasp the moral status 
of other creatures, dogs and cats are not the kind of agents towards whom mor-
al expectations should be harboured.10 Consequently, since they are not respon-
sible moral agents of whom we could rightfully demand that they respect other 
beings’ moral status, resenting, blaming or even punishing the cat or dog for 
their actions would treat them unfairly: It would inflict negative consequences 
on them on grounds of unfair expectations. Excluding animals from the class of 
duty-bearers, then, does not amount to disregarding their moral status. Rather, 
it is the inclusion of animals in this class that treats them immorally. 
                                                             
10  Again, it might be thought that this conclusion is too strong. For, even if we may not feel 
anger towards our dog chasing squirrels, we might very well blame it for violating one of 
our ‘house rules’ by chewing shoes, say. If so, blameworthiness, just as the attribution of 
moral duties, might be thought to be a gradual, not be a binary phenomenon. To this, we 
repeat our response of footnote 6: Whilst we are not convinced by this objection, we would 
like to point out that even if it were accepted, it would not suffice for animal citizenship. 
We thank an anonymous referee for this objection. 
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Hence, adoption of a cognitively demanding approach to moral duty should 
not be understood as the attempt to cling on to a rationalist, let alone speciesist, 
account of moral agency which aims to exclude animals from the class of mor-
al agents. Nor does it amount to a sterile exercise in identifying eligibility crite-
ria that animals do or do not fulfil.11 Rather, coupling moral duty with cognitive 
capacities pays heed to the varying relationships in which we stand to each 
other and protects individuals with limited cognitive capacities from unfair 
expectations, blame and possibly even punishment. Fairness demands, then, 
that we should not regard animals as moral agents that are morally responsible 
for their actions and subject to moral obligations. 
Of course, concluding that cats do not have the duty to respect mice’s rights 
does not rule out that humans might have the duty to stop cats from killing 
mice. Quite tellingly, this subtle switch from alleged animal duties to the duties 
of humans can be observed regularly in Donaldson and Kymlicka’s book. For 
instance, just one sentence further on from their remark about the duties of 
animal citizens, Donaldson and Kymlicka ask how “we could fulfill our duty to 
feed our cats without violating the rights of other animals not to be killed” 
(2011, 150, our emphasis). However, we should not be misled into thinking 
that since we might have the duty to respect mice’s rights, so do cats. Alleged 
animal duties and human duties must be kept strictly apart. 
3.3  Animal Citizenship? 
The idea of citizenship, we have explained, is composed of several different 
elements. Although we have already discussed how two of them – rights and 
duties – might or might not apply to animals, it is still worthwhile examining 
some of the specific ideas associated with animal citizenship in some detail. Here, 
we will focus on two lines of argument only, namely the alleged political agency 
of animals and their supposed full membership in our political community (see 
Alhaus and Niesen 2015, in this HSR Forum). We will start with the former.  
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 103) agree that citizenship is “an active 
role, in which individuals are contributing agents and not simply passive recip-
ients of benefits.” They concur further that this active role requires citizens to 
possess important capacities, such as the capacity to have and communicate 
one’s own subjective good, the ability to comply with social norms and the 
capacity of political participation. At the same time, they are adamant that these 
requirements do not rule out domesticated animals as candidates for citizen-
ship. For, according to them, animals possess these qualities of political agency 
– at least if correctly interpreted. We find their case less than convincing. 
                                                             
11  Compare Donaldson and Kymlicka’s (2011, 60) remarks on the difference between ap-
proaching citizenship as a property of individuals and as a feature that inheres in a relation-
ship amongst individuals. 
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Donaldson and Kymlicka’s main argument for the political agency of ani-
mals is that by their sheer presence, animals can influence political decisions: 
“The dogs themselves, by their presence, are agents of change. They are not 
deliberate agents. But they are agents – leading their lives, doing the things 
they do – and because this agency is exercised in the public realm, it serves as a 
catalyst for political deliberation” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 113-4, our 
emphasis). It is obvious that this argument cannot establish political agency. If 
dogs were to qualify as political agents because of the influence that their pres-
ence exerts on political decisions, then polluted air, the presence of which also 
influences environmental policy, would also have to count as a political agent. 
The same holds true for the argument that animals often function as ‘ice-
breakers,’ and thus that “companion animals actively foster contact, trust, and 
reciprocity within communities” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 115). Again, 
if carrying a funny toy was an ice-breaker, this toy would also have to be seen 
as a political agent that actively fosters contact.12  
Of course, lack of active political agency does not imply that considerations 
about animals’ subjective good should not enter political deliberation, no mat-
ter whether Donaldson and Kymlicka’s model of dependent agency is adopted 
or not. However, we must exercise caution when examining the basis on which 
animal rights are grounded. Three such bases are conceivable: Firstly, animal 
rights could be associated with animals’ universal moral status; secondly, they 
might arise from the special relationship between animals and their owners; 
finally, they could be based on their alleged full membership in our political 
community.13 Pace Donaldson and Kymlicka, we do not believe that member-
ship in a mixed human-animal society can fulfil this function. Rather, our du-
ties to animals are grounded either on their universal moral status or on special, 
private relationships between humans and animals. 
As Donaldson and Kymlicka stress, and we are willing to agree, domesticat-
ed animals differ from liminal and wild animals both with regard to shared 
living space and dependence relations.14 However, even if so, this does not 
                                                             
12  As an anonymous referee pointed out, this might not be quite fair, as air – in contrast to 
dogs – is not eligible for agency. This is true. However, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s arguments 
discussed here crucially rely on the mere presence of dogs, rather than their agency. Our 
examples are to highlight that this reliance on the presence of some being or object does 
not suffice in establishing political participation. 
13  As an aside, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 132) themselves point out that several implica-
tions of animal citizenship that they sketch are not actually due to citizenship. We believe 
that this holds true of most, if not all, consequences they mention. 
14  Donaldson and Kymlicka use these three categories to distinguish between animals which 
are candidates for citizenship and those which are not. In order to make sense of citizen-
ship, though, we also need to determine what differentiates citizens from non-citizens 
within the category of domesticated animals. This is where membership comes in. However, 
it is not entirely clear that this criterion can usefully be applied to the animal case. To elab-
orate, we need to ask ourselves, not just how the rights between domesticated and wild an-
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establish that domesticated animals are members of our political community. 
To elaborate, it might well be the case that domesticated animals are often 
perceived as members of their respective ‘families’: They are much loved by 
their companions, a sense of loyalty and belonging obtains, a joint way of life 
is established, etc. Importantly, though, this joint life is distinctly private. Quite 
tellingly, many of the anecdotes that Donaldson and Kymlicka present as ex-
amples for the cooperation between animals and humans concern arrangements 
such as joint walks, or understandings as to when animals want to be left alone 
or be touched by their owners. They are not examples of public or political 
cooperation. We believe that this focus on private anecdotes is not coincidental. 
For, it remains unclear to us how a dog or a cat, say, can be seen to be a mem-
ber of the distinctly public, cooperative venture of society that seeks to further 
its members’ interests through the provision of public goods. To see why, im-
agine that there were no public or social cooperation. Imagine, that is, that we 
deal with some non-cooperative state of nature where every man fights for 
himself. In a situation like this, as philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke or 
Nozick never tire of telling us, the interests of our lone fighters would be badly 
served, as they could either not be realised at all, or could not be realised as 
well as within a cooperative community. Imagine next that our lone fighter also 
had a dog in this state of nature. Would its interests be adversely affected by 
the lack of political cooperation? As long as its lone human companion cares 
for the dog, we cannot see why they should be. For, the realisation of domesti-
cated animals’ interests does not rely on the provision of public goods in the 
same way that human interests are dependent on public cooperation.15 Conse-
quently, although the private, special relationship to their owners might be of 
paramount importance at least to certain domesticated animals, they have no 
stake in the public, cooperative venture. Domesticated animals, therefore, may 
be members of private families, but they are not members of a public, political 
community. Domesticated animals, then, are not co-citizens.  
                                                                                                                                
imals differ, but also how, when in Germany, the rights of an English dog differ from the 
rights of a German dog, say. Would the English dog’s mobility be more restricted? Would its 
interests not be reflected in public policy? How, if at all, would an English dog’s interests 
differ from the German dog’s concerns? Would it not have to be protected from other ani-
mals, and if so would that be due to its non-citizen status or because its English owner 
would have the duty to protect it? Whilst Donaldson and Kymlicka pay much attention to 
the distinction between domesticated, liminal and wild animals, the difference between citi-
zen and non-citizen domesticated animals remains underexposed. 
15  Put somewhat more precisely, if the dog’s interests were negatively affected, they would be 
so vicariously through the interests of his lone owner. 
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3.4  Humans 
It is uncontroversial that adult human beings with fully developed cognitive 
abilities are right-holders, the bearers of duty and citizens of a political com-
munity. However, humans who do not possess these abilities or have not as yet 
developed them, might be thought to spell trouble for our negative conclusion 
about animal citizenship. For, if animals are denied citizen status on grounds of 
their cognitive limitations, human beings who share these limitations – most 
prominently young children and the mentally disabled – must also be excluded 
from the class of citizens. Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 104) use this argu-
ment as a reductio ad absurdum: Since any such exclusion would be unac-
ceptable, any conception of citizenship which entails that children and the 
disabled are not co-citizens must be rejected. We agree that most arguments 
which we put forward in the context of animals also apply to children and the 
disabled. However, we disagree that such an application amounts to a reductio.  
To see why, let us concentrate on the case of young children only. Young 
children clearly have valuable interests which need to be protected by rights. 
For instance, they have the right not to be harmed, the right to be educated, the 
right to have their interests counted within political deliberation, etc. However, 
they are not responsible moral agents for exactly the same reasons as animals 
cannot be understood as moral agents: Since young children cannot as yet 
understand the demands of morality, it would be unfair to hold them responsi-
ble, let alone blame and punish them, when they violate moral requirements.16 
In light of their limited cognitive abilities, young children also do not qualify as 
full members of our political community. Although their interests are to be 
considered within political deliberation, children do not have the right to vote 
or stand for office, say, because they are unable to grasp and take decisions 
within the political arena. The same holds true for the mentally disabled. It is 
correct, then, that our conception of moral duty and citizenship entails that 
children and the mentally disabled are neither the bearers of duty nor full citi-
zens. But this, we suggest, is just as it should be. 
In Donaldson and Kymlicka’s (2011, 57) eyes, though, a conception of citi-
zenship such as ours falls into the trap of reducing citizenship to political agen-
cy whilst neglecting other crucial dimensions thereof. This renders it unable to 
account for the fact that children and the mentally disabled differ in crucial 
                                                             
16  Of course, young children are told off when they act wrongly. Still, this should be regarded 
as an educational measure, not as a case of blaming on grounds of attributions of moral 
responsibility. Blaming enters the picture only when children have reached the stage when 
they can know, or could have known, that what they did was wrong. At which point this 
stage is reached is, of course, an empirical question. Once children have developed certain 
cognitive abilities, though, we see a marked difference in our treatment of them: Not only 
are they now eligible for blame (certainly within certain constraints), but they are also given 
more participatory rights, as for instance in the form of pupil representation. 
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respects from refugees or tourists, in that they have the right to live in and 
return to a certain territory of the state and to have their interests counted with-
in political deliberation. Any plausible account of citizenship, therefore, must 
regard children and the disabled as citizens in some sense of the word ‘citizen.’ 
Indeed, we agree. As the careful reader may have noted, in the previous para-
graph we have not denied that children and the mentally disabled are citizens, 
but that they are full citizens. How can we uphold this distinction between 
citizens and full citizens? Moreover, how can we maintain this distinction 
without having to attribute some citizen status to domesticated animals? The 
key is again found in our remarks about membership. The reason why children 
and the disabled are members of our community is that children and the disa-
bled have a real stake in the cooperative venture: Their interests would be 
adversely affected if there were no public cooperation. Accordingly, although 
there is a parallel between children, the mentally disabled and animals with 
regard to cognitive limitations, there is also an important dissimilarity concern-
ing membership. Hence, whilst children and the mentally disabled are citizens, 
albeit not full citizens, domesticated animals are not. The alleged counterexam-
ples of children and the mentally disabled do not undermine our result that 
animals are right-holders, but neither the bearer of duties nor our co-citizens. 
4.  Robots 
The moral status of animals has concerned philosophers for some time. Alt-
hough this debate has lost none of its urgency, we will argue next that it should 
be expanded so as to include enquiries into the moral standing of a further 
‘species,’ namely robots. For, if we take seriously Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
invitation to look more closely at the interests and rights of those with whom 
we share our living space, we must realise that current developments in artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) point to the fact that in future, we will share our homes 
not only with domesticated animals, but also with highly intelligent robots. If 
so, we must ask what we might morally owe to these robots – and what they 
might morally owe to us. 
Still, this expansion might seem surprising, maybe even misguided at first. 
Contrary to humans and animals, it might be thought, robots are nothing more 
than machines, or tools, that were designed to fulfil a specific function. These 
machines have no interests or desires; they do not make choices or pursue life 
plans; they do not interpret, interact with and learn about the world. Rather than 
engaging in autonomous decision-making on the basis of self-developed objec-
tives and interpretations of their surroundings, all they do is execute a pre-
installed programme. In short, robots are inanimate automatons, not autono-
mous agents. As such, they are not even the kind of object which could have a 
moral status – questions about rights, duties and citizenship simply do not arise 
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with regard to man-made machines. Such an assessment certainly holds true of 
robots of the first generation, such as industrial robots used in car manufactur-
ing, vacuum cleaners or even chess computers. However, recent advances 
within the field of AI show that such a conclusion would be premature with 
regard to more sophisticated robots. 
To give but one example for the increased autonomy of robots, meet robot 
Myon, which has been developed by scientists of the Humboldt University in 
Berlin (Hild et al. 2012). Myon has just started its stage career by joining an 
opera project with the Komische Oper Berlin with the aim of starring in one of 
its productions during the summer of 2015. However, dance moves and acting 
performances have not been written into Myon’s programme. All that Myon 
has been equipped with by its designers are very basic algorithms that allow it 
to perceive its surroundings and learn from its interactions with its environ-
ment. It does so by employing a camera, computing acoustic signals and meas-
uring the use of energy by its own engines. In this way, Myon can tell when it 
loses its balance because it has been nudged, enabling it to figure out how to 
move more efficiently and how to avoid situations in which pushes are likely to 
occur. Accordingly, Myon not only reacts to external stimuli, but also com-
putes such stimuli on a higher level by evaluating the functionality of actions 
and features of situations for long-term, more important objectives. Based on 
these rudimentary capabilities, it is currently learning how to move along with 
music simply by interacting with other actors and interpreting the gestures of 
the director. How Myon will behave and move by the end of the season re-
mains to be seen: it depends solely on how its learning processes advance. 
Myon is no isolated case. Rather, robots of the newest generation are no 
longer fitted out with a fixed stock of pre-determined actions, but are designed 
in a way that enables them to acquire new modes of behaviour (Berthold and 
Hafner 2014; Kajic et al. 2014; Noor 2015). Endowed with just a few capabili-
ties and objectives, including the possession of sensors that allow them to per-
ceive their environment, robots can thus embark on their own learning process-
es which include not only the acquisition of new beliefs, but also modifications 
of their objectives (Schillaci et al. 2011; Oudeyer et al. 2007).  
Consequently, the abilities of future robots will by far exceed those of ordi-
nary machines. As such, what we can currently observe within the field of AI is 
a trend away from so called weak AI, according to which the prospects of 
artificial intelligence are very limited, towards strong AI, which submits that 
robots of the future will not just simulate conscious decision processes but will 
have such processes (Dennett 1997; Sun 2001).17 Hence, although considera-
tions about sophisticated robots may sound like material for science-fiction 
                                                             
17  Dennett (1997, 27), for instance, predicts that at some point, the phenomenology of robots 
will be so complex that we cannot read its experiential states off its hard disc, but need to 
ask the robot to give a self-report about its experiences and goals. 
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novels, there are suggestions that replicating human performance through arti-
ficial brains might be feasible within the next 50 years (Sandberg and Bostrom 
2008; Price and Tallinn 2012). The question, therefore, does not seem to be if, 
but when sophisticated robots will become a reality. Accordingly, if robots 
developed ever larger degrees of autonomy, including the development of their 
own objectives and the acquisition of new beliefs, they would become striking-
ly similar to humans and animals. If so, the categorisation of robots as agents 
might become inevitable. And once we regard them as agents, we need to en-
quire what moral status robots have. 
Since it cannot be foreseen whether or not advocates of strong AI will be 
proven right, studies about the moral status of sophisticated robots must inevi-
tably be speculative. Nonetheless, some fundamental observations about the 
potential moral implications of strong AI are possible.  
4.1  Rights and Robots 
If we are to follow advocates of strong AI, it is very likely that future robots 
will closely resemble humans and animals in that they will qualify as agents 
which choose appropriate means in order to attain a self-chosen end. However, 
robots will also differ from animals and humans in important respects, so that 
the agency of robots need not entail that they are also right holders. In order to 
be regarded as the holder of rights, robots would have to be sentient beings 
with an idea of a subjective good and important interests that are worthy of 
protection. Do robots have such important interests? Are they sentient beings 
that care whether their lives go better or worse?18  
It is clear that robots are not sentient in the common sense of the word, i.e. 
they do not feel pain or pleasure in the way that humans or animals would do. 
If a robot falls over, this may cause damage, but not pain. Similarly, if it 
achieves an objective, it will not feel exhilaration, nor will it feel frustration 
when it fails to do so. Hence, robots do not experience pain, pleasure or emo-
tions in the way that humans or animals do. However, robots such as Myon 
show reactions which are functionally similar: Myon assesses the impact of its 
environment on its body by use of its sensors and aims to avoid situations 
which lead to negatively evaluated sensory impressions. Hence, it seems not 
totally implausible to submit that even now, robots can be attributed a naïve or 
rudimentary idea of their subjective good. Accordingly, although robots do not 
have the same qualitative experiential states as humans and animals, they might 
still have functionally equivalent states. Unless it can be argued that these 
qualitative dissimilarities between human and robot sensations are morally 
                                                             
18  Interestingly, the current debate about robots focuses on the question of whether or not 
robots are the bearers of duties (for example, see Powers 2011; Sullins 2006), not whether 
they have rights.  
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relevant – that is, that it makes a moral difference whether frustration or pain is 
felt the human or the robot way – robots’ interests might be valuable and wor-
thy of protection. Robots might be right-holders.  
Any such conclusion would have considerable consequences. Pressing an 
emergency kill button of a sophisticated robot, as planned with regard to the MIT 
robot Coq, would no longer be a morally neutral option: Pressing this button 
would not simply amount to switching off a machine, but to the violation of 
Coq’s rights. Similarly, intelligent robots could not simply be employed as mine-
sweepers, nor forced into other kinds of labour. The increased autonomy of future 
robots may thus have a major impact on how we treat and employ them. 
4.2  Robots’ Duties 
Might robots of the future not only be agents, but also moral agents? That is, 
might they be the bearer of duties whose actions are subject to moral require-
ments? If it were correct that future robots will not only be capable of autono-
mous decision-making but also be protected by rights, questions about their 
moral duties would become just the more pressing. For, robots’ greater auton-
omy and capability implies less human control. Less human control, in turn, 
entails an increased risk for humans to be harmed by robots. If, in addition, 
robots were also right-holders, switching them off or destroying them in order 
to protect us would become a morally vexed issue. Consequently, the more 
autonomous and powerful robots become, the more important it is for us that 
robots can be moral agents who adhere to moral rules and respect our rights.  
So, is it conceivable that robots will be able to understand moral reasons and 
adjust their actions accordingly? Imagine that a robot stepped on your foot and 
caused you some real pain. Should we regard this robot as a fully responsible 
agent who should be blamed for its wrongdoings? Of course, our answer must 
depend on the qualities of the robot. First, assume that the robot was programmed 
in such a way that its software requires it to follow moral desires – for instance, it 
cannot have the goal to harm anyone – and to regulate its actions accordingly. 
Most of the time, it performs this function flawlessly, but every so often the soft-
ware freezes and something goes wrong.19 It is clear that in a case such as this, 
                                                             
19  The case of robots executing pre-installed utility functions raises interesting questions 
about the moral duty of programmers to design only ‘moral’ robots, i.e. robots that pursue 
only moral objectives (Tamburrini 2009). Since we focus on the moral status of robots, not 
the moral duties of their designers or owners, we will not follow this question here. See 
Hughes (2012) for a discussion of robots which have been programmed in such a way that 
they have moral objectives and can regulate their desires accordingly as well as Hevelke and 
Nida-Rümelin (2014) for a study into the normative consequences of autonomous vehicles. 
Compare also Asimov’s (1984) rules which prescribe (1) that a robot may not harm human 
beings or allow them to be harmed; (2) that a robot must obey a human’s order unless this 
order would violate the first requirement, and (3) that a robot must protect its own exist-
ence, unless this violates the first two requirements.  
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the robot cannot be held morally responsible for stepping on someone’s foot. 
Since this robot is nothing more than a machine running programmes, it is not an 
appropriate object for moral assessment and reactive attitudes.  
Imagine next that we were dealing with a sophisticated, more autonomous 
robot, i.e. a robot that can learn about its environment and develop its own 
goals. It also has higher-order cognitive capacities, being able to reflect about 
and modify its goals on grounds of higher-order objectives. If so, the robot’s 
stepping on your foot could not necessarily be put down to the malfunction of 
some software. Yet, nor could it automatically be interpreted as the intentional 
violation of moral demands or an expression of malevolence. The robot might 
be a psychopath with high cognitive capacities, but severe moral deficiencies: 
very intelligent, but unable to understand the requirements of morality and to 
assume attitudes such as benevolence and malevolence.20 If so, the robot may 
once more fall into that category of agents towards which reactive attitudes 
would be inappropriate because it does not possess the whole spectrum of 
qualities required for moral agency. Consequently, future robots could be inter-
preted as moral agents, and thus the bearers of duty, only if they could grasp 
and deliberately breach moral demands. Is it conceivable that robots will ever 
develop these competencies? If robots could, on grounds of observations and 
interactions, learn about general regularities, it might also be the case that they 
will be able to pick up moral rules. However, whether or not this suffices for 
moral responsibility and, importantly, whether or not robots would indeed 
adopt these rules as their own, remains open. 
4.3  Robot Citizenship 
Finally, we can address the question of robot citizenship. It is quite likely that 
future robots will be agents. It might also be the case that in light of their in-
creased autonomy, sophisticated robots will have to be regarded as right-
holders and, possibly more doubtfully, duty bearers. For citizenship, they 
would additionally need to be regarded as members of our cooperative venture, 
sharing the same living space with us and standing in interdependent relations 
with other individuals.  
Starting with the requirement of residency, we take it that at least initially 
robots will live together with us. As robots are currently employed within our 
                                                             
20  As mentioned in footnote 9, we would like to remain neutral on the specific metaethical 
interpretation of these claims. If a purely cognitivist, rationalist metaethical position were 
adopted, it could be argued that this robot has high cognitive abilities, but still lacks the 
faculty of reason that would be required for moral understanding. If, in turn, a sentimental-
ists or expressivists account were assumed, it could be submitted that the robot is highly 
intelligent, but lacks the emotional repertoire necessary for moral judgement. Accordingly, 
our argument is compatible with differing metaethical positions, although its precise for-
mulation would need to be adapted depending on this metaethical choice.  
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daily lives, there is no reason to believe that their sophisticated descendants 
would not start out in our midst. With regard to interdependency and cooperation, 
different scenarios are conceivable. According to the first, it is possible that ro-
bots will be able to achieve their goals only through cooperation, that is by join-
ing our cooperative venture which furthers the interests of its members. Since 
future robots will be more and more ‘man-like,’ choosing their own objectives 
and reflecting about their goals, it is likely that they too will have interests 
which can be realised or promoted only if they work together with the wider, 
public community. In contrast to domesticated animals, then, robots might have 
to be regarded as full members of our society, and thus our co-citizens. The sec-
ond scenario is less rosy. Following Vernor Vinge (1993), we have to realise that 
if machines ever were as intelligent as humans, they would be so only briefly. 
For, if robots ever reached our level of intelligence, there is no reason to believe 
that their cognitive abilities would stop there. Rather, they will quickly overtake 
human intelligence and will, indeed, be better than we are at designing even more 
intelligent machines. With this ‘intelligence explosion’ (Chalmers 2010) in full 
flow, we simply would not know how robots would behave. Would they still 
appreciate human cooperation and even share our values? Or would there be no 
need for them to join our community and cooperate with us, possibly being utter-
ly indifferent to our well-being? In the worst-case scenario, then, thinking about 
extending citizenship to include robots might be the least of our worries.  
Rapid developments within AI thus confront us with pressing moral ques-
tions. Given the great uncertainty of these advancements, two general ways of 
approaching intelligent machines are conceivable. More optimistically, designers 
could try to influence robots’ development so as to nudge them towards morally 
responsible behaviour. More pessimistically, we would have to stop the devel-
opment of AI before it spins out of control. 
5.  Conclusion 
By devising their vision of Zoopolis, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka have 
given the debate about animal rights a strong new impulse. Nevertheless, in this 
article we have rejected their case for animal citizenship. Whilst animals’ valua-
ble interests demand that they be protected by rights, moral considerations about 
moral responsibility and ought implies can show that they should not be regarded 
as the bearers of duties. Severe doubts about domesticated animals’ membership 
of our political community, rather than private families, speak against granting 
citizenship to domesticated animals. Hence, although domesticated animals have 
rights, they can be regarded neither as the bearers of duties nor our co-citizens. 
However, we have argued that there is a new ‘species’ growing in our midst, 
co-habiting and standing in some interdependent relations with us, which pro-
vides a further, possibly even harder test case for Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
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ideas on citizenship. These are sophisticated, autonomous robots, which will not 
only share the qualities of agency with humans and animals, but also exceed 
animals’ and probably human cognitive abilities. Given the many possibilities 
that open up through new advances within AI, this is the time to start consider-
ing the moral implications of these developments. 
Hence, although Donaldson and Kymlicka’s arguments for animal citizenship 
fail, our discussion of robots’ moral status shows that their reflections should 
not be taken as being limited to animals only. Given the collapse of their specific 
case for animal citizenship, though, we would like to close with a speculative 
remark about the interpretation of Zoopolis. As Donaldson and Kymlicka repeat-
edly stress, in their eyes the animal rights movement has somewhat ground to a 
halt, failing to elicit the political reactions that would be required for the success-
ful protection of animal rights. This backdrop might suggest interpreting their 
case for animal citizenship as an attempt to provide a further kick-start for this 
political debate, with animal citizenship being an instrument for the realisation of 
animal rights, not an end in itself. Possibly, then, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
thoughts on citizenship should not be understood as being exclusively philosoph-
ically motivated; they might also be read as being part of a politically driven 
campaign. 
References 
Ahlhaus, Svenja, and Peter Niesen. 2015. What is Animal Politics? Outline of a 
New Research Agenda. Historical Social Research 40 (4): 7-31. doi: 10.12759/ 
hsr.40.2015.4.7-31. 
Asimov, Isaac. 1984. The Bicentennial Man. In Philosophy and Science Fiction, ed. 
Michael Philips, 183-216. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.  
Berthold, Oswald, and Verena V. Hafner. 2014. Unsupervised Learning of Sensory 
Primitives from Optical Flow Fields. In From Animals to Animats 13. 13th Inter-
national Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior, SAB 2014, Proeceed-
ings, ed. Angel P. Del Pobil, Eris Chinellato, Ester Martinez-Martin, John 
Hallam, Enric Cervera and Antonio Morales, 188-97. Luxemburg: Springer. 
Chalmers, David J. 2010. The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10): 7-65. 
Dennett, Daniel C. 1997. Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds. In Cognition, 
Computation, and Consciousness, ed. Masao Ito, Yasushi Miyashita and Edmund 
T. Rolls, 17-29. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Donaldson, Sue, and Will Kymlicka. 2011. Zoopolis. A Political Theory of Animal 
Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hart, Herbert L. A. 1982. Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Politi-
cal Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hevelke, Alexander, and Julian Nida-Rümelin. 2014. Responsibility for Crashes of 
Autonomous Vehicles: An Ethical Analysis. Science and Engineering Ethics 21 
(3): 619-30.  
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  90 
Hild, Manfred, Torsten Siedel, Christian Benckendorff, Christian Thiele, and Mi-
chael Spranger. 2012. Myon, a New Humanoid. In Language grounding in ro-
bots, ed. Luc Steels and Manfred Hild, 25-44. New York: Springer.  
Hohfeld, Wesley N. 1919. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, ed. Walter W. Cooke. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Hughes, James. 2012. Compassionate AI and Selfless Robots: A Buddhist Ap-
proach. In Robot ethics: the ethical and social implications of robotics, ed. Pat-
rick Lin, Keith Abney and George A. Bekey, 69-83. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Janoski, Thomas. 1998. Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and 
Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kajic, Ivana, Guido Schillaci, Saša Bodiroža, and Verena V. Hafner. 2014. A Bio-
logically Inspired Model for Coding Sensorimotor Experience Leading to the De-
velopment of Pointing Behaviour in a Humanoid Robot. Paper Presented at 
Workshop on “HRI: a bridge between Robotics and Neuroscience” at HRI-2014, 
March 3-6, Bielefeld, Germany. 
Kramer, Matthew H., Nigel E. Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner. 1998. A Debate over 
Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leydet, Dominique. 2014. ‘Citizenship’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (Spring 2014), ed. Edward N. Zalta. Stanford: The Metaphysics Research 
Lab <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/citizenship/> (Accessed 
March 4, 2015). 
Noor, Ahmed K. 2015. Potential of Cognitive Computing and Cognitive Systems. 
Open Engineering 5 (1): 75-88. 
Oudeyer, Pierre-Yves, Frédéric Kaplan, and Verena V. Hafner. 2007. Intrinsic 
motivation systems for autonomous mental development. In IEEE Transactions 
on Evolutionary Computation 11 (2): 265-86. 
Powers, Thomas M. 2011. On the Moral Agency of Computers. Topoi 32 (2): 227-36.  
Price, Huw, and Jaan Tallinn. 2012. Artificial intelligence – can we keep it in the 
box? The Conversation, May 2012 <http://theconversation.com/artificial-intell 
igence-can-we-keep-it-in-the-box-8541> (Accessed March 14, 2015). 
Rawls, John. 1999 [1971]. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belnap Press. 
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sandberg, Aanders, and Nick Bostrom. 2008. Whole Brain Emulation: A Roadmap. 
Technical Report. Future of Humanity Institute. Oxford University 
<www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/reports/2008-3.pdf> (Accessed March 14, 2015). 
Schillaci, Guido, Verena V. Hafner, Bruno Lara, and Marc Grosjean. 2011. Is That 
Me? Sensorimotor Learning and Self-Other Distinction in Robotics. In Proceed-
ings of the 8th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interac-
tion, 223-4. Tokyo: HRI. 
Steiner, Hillel. 1994. An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Strawson, Peter. 1962. Freedom and Resentment. In Proceedings of the British Acad-
emy 48: 1-25.  
Sullins, John P. 2006. When Is a Robot a Moral Agent? In International Review of 
Information Ethics 6: 23-30. 
Sumner, Leonard W. 2000. Rights. In The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. 
H. LaFolette, 288-305. Oxford: Blackwell. 
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  91 
Sun, Ron. 2001. Computation, Reduction, and Teleology of Consciousness. Journal 
of Cognitive Systems Research 1: 241-9.  
Tamburrini, Guglielmo. 2009. Robot Ethics: A view from the philosophy of sci-
ence. In Ethics and Robotics, ed. Rafael Capurro and Michael Nagenborg, 11-23. 
Heidelberg: IOS Press.  
Vinge, Vernor. 1993. ‘The Coming Technological Singularity’, Vision 21: Interdisci-
plinary Science & Engineering in the Era of CyberSpace. In Proceedings of a Sym-
posium held at NASA Lewis Research Center (NASA Conference Publication CP-
10129) <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.html> (Ac-
cessed June 14, 2015). 
